In defense of the burka

Please, don’t get me wrong:  I hate the burka.

In my never-humble-opinion,  wearing a burka (or niqab) is immoral.

So, I resent having to write in the defense of the burka!

…because, nothing, not even the burka or niqab, grant any government the power to legislate a citizen’s choices in clothing.

The government does not – and must not – have the right to tell me how to dress.  What to wear or what not to wear.  EVER!!!

‘Governments’ simply lack the authority to a law that determines how I choose to dress.

However…

This does not mean that governments do not have the right to enforce a dress code in public buildings/parks/vehicles etc.

As in, if you enter a public building – for whatever reason – the government which administers it has the right to demand that you wear shoes (that is a safety/liability issue – stepping on stuff can harm an unprotected foot), and so on.  In the same way, the government has the right to demand that every person entering a public building or park (anything administered by that level of government) must not cover their face.

Therefore, schools, libraries, public transit, hospitals, government offices – well, all the ‘public spaces’ – are areas where the government has the authority to pass a law that people must show their faces.  Fully.

That IS within the government’s jurisdiction to pass laws about.

And yes, governments SHOULD pass these laws!!!

Leaving all the ‘obvious’ reasons aside (many people have made these arguments very eloquently already), another very valid argument could be made that it is absolutely necessary that a person’s mouth be fully visible while in public buildings:  obscuring one’s mouth is discriminatory.

Our laws , our very constitutions, forbid discrimination on he grounds of disability.  Governments naturally hire people based on their skills, regardless of any potential disabilities – like, say, being hearing impaired….  Whether accessing or providing a government service, lipreading is an accepted means of communicating and much more common than most people realize.  Many of us even do it without realizing it!

Obscuring one’s lips behind a veil thus discriminates against people who are hearing impaired and rely fully or partially on lipreading to communicate.  This is an important issue:  a constitutional matter!  Perhaps this argument appears disproportional, but, please, take a moment to think about it.  It is a valid point.

And, for a society which prides itself on being inclusive and does not discriminate against people with physical disabilities, this is a big deal.

Of course, all private places of business also have the right to enforce dress codes for people who enter their premises.  That is fully accepted in our society, and must remain so.  It is best captured by the signs:  “No shoes, no shirt, no service.”

Perhaps the new ones will read:  “No shoes, no shirt, no face, no entry!”

And that would be good.

It not only ‘would be good’, in my never-humble-opinion, it is necessary.

It also seems to me that our existing laws already cover this issue (no pun intended).

Private places of commerce have the right to enforce dress codes.  They are free to ban ‘face coverings’ – and must remain free to do so.

Public places are also governed by rules which can be interpreted as forbidding ‘face coverings’:  on the grounds that covering one’s mouth discriminates against people who are hearing impaired.  This is not permitted in public places.  Therefore, no burka, no niqab.

We even have a law (at least in Ontario) which says that a driver’s face must be fully visible and recognizable from outside the vehicle:  that is why the front windows in a car are not permitted to have a dark tint.  Wearing a veil of any type which is not transparent and obscures a driver’s face, or any other thing which prevents the driver’s face to be fully visible from outside the vehicle is, therefore, already illegal!

No new law needed!

It is not a good idea to have more laws than absolutely necessary.  Passing multiple laws to govern one thing is misguided and dangerous.

To sum it up:

  • governments can, do and should have dress codes for people entering public buildings or accessing public services which demand that a person’s face be fully exposed
  • places of commerce can, do and should have dress codes of their choosing – even ones that forbid people entering their property from obscuring their faces.
  • traffic laws already exist that demand that while a person is exercising the privilege of driving, their face must be fully exposed and visible from outside the vehicle

Perhaps I’ve missed a few specific instances, I’ll grant that.  BUT – they would still be ‘specific instances’!  It is wrong to pass a blanket law which bans the burka.

Permitting the government the exercise any authority to legislate how people dress is as frightening as it is ludicrous!

Who’d enforce these laws?

The ‘Fashion Police’?

The ‘Wilson’ case

This is supporting material for my narrative of the ‘Richard Warman v FreeDominion/internet privacy’ appeal hearing on 8th of April, 2010.

The arguments made during the hearing referenced various cases, rulings and precedents. Since I am not a lawyer, nor trained in law in any way, it helped me understand what was going on when I looked up a few of them.

The ‘Wilson’ case

This may be a distasteful case, but the ruling in it establishes an important principle.

Miles Wilson was accused of possessing child pornography.  The police followed a trail where they found an IP address they believed would lead them to the suspect.  The police officer found out that that IP address was served by the ISP provider Bell Canada, and wrote them a ‘form lettter’ requestisng disclosure of the physical location of this IP address.  Based on this information, the police officer obtained a search warrant for the residence indicated, executed the search and found the evidence the police were seeking to prosecute Mr. Wilson.

An analysis of this case from ‘The Court’:

The fundamental issue before Leitch R.S.J. of the Superior Court of Justice was whether, in accessing the accused’s name and street address from Bell without first obtaining a warrant, police had infringed upon the accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy, contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. Remove the legalese and the issue in Wilson becomes far more dramatic: are Canadians free from unbridled state surveillance of their online activities while in the confines of their homes?

First, in rejecting the accused’s s. 8 claim, Leitch R.S.J. determined that one’s name and address, or that of one’s spouse, falls beyond the inference-resistant “biographical core” threshold of Plant. Second, Letich R.S.J. found that given the fact that names and address are “information available to anyone in a public directory”, they are, in isolation, largely meaningless pieces of information as far as s. 8 is concerned.

Here, the issue is in the criminal realm, not the civil case we are talking about here.  However, there are aspects of this case which were examined and discussed during the appeal hearing, specifically as related to the IP address, the expectation of privacy and the differences between this case and the one under review.

The ‘York University’ case

This is supporting material for my narrative of the ‘Richard Warman v FreeDominion/internet privacy’ appeal hearing on 8th of April, 2010.

The arguments made during the hearing referenced various cases, rulings and precedents. Since I am not a lawyer, nor trained in law in any way, it helped me understand what was going on when I looked up a few of them.

The York University case

York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises, 2009 CanLII 46447 (ON S.C.)

This is an important case because here, the Norwich order (precedent) was used to obtain information about email accounts from an ISP.

Some people wrote a letter about the president of York University which alleged ‘bad stuff’. York University wanted to find out who sent the email, and sued the internet provides (Bell Canada Enterprises and Rogers Communications) to get the information.  The Norwich order was accepted by the judge (G.R. Strathy J) as applying in this case, as per Slaw.ca:

The 5 elements identified in this case for granting such an order include:


(i) Whether the applicant has provided evidence sufficient to raise a valid, bona fide or reasonable claim;
(ii) Whether the applicant has established a relationship with the third party from whom the information is sought such that it establishes that the third party is somehow involved in the acts complained of;
(iii) Whether the third party is the only practicable source of the information available;
(iv) Whether the third party can be indemnified for costs to which the third party may be exposed because of the disclosure, some [authorities] refer to the associated expenses of complying with the orders, while others speak of damages; and
(v) Whether the interests of justice favour the obtaining of disclosure.
[emphasis added]

Additionally, a strong case of fraud removes the possibility of a frivolous or vexatious application of the order.

However, there were some significant differences between the York University case and the ‘Warman v FD/internet privacy’ one.  This is just transcribing a few arguments from my notes from the hearing (any and all errors or misrepresentations are mine and I apologize – it is hard to write things down as fast as people are speaking).

Ms. Matheson for the CCLA (I am paraphrasing, keeping as true as possible to her speech):

The York case is a good decision because it ‘passed the test’ – the judges ruling was based on an established prima facie case.  There was a second reason – the agreement between the users and the ISP – but, the judge did apply the test fist.

Internet encourages free speech and anonymity is a critical component of this speech.

It is not a ‘blank cheque’ for defamation, but due regard must be given to Freedom of Expression. In this case, in front of the court now [the ‘Warman v FD/internet privacy’ case], no such consideration was given.

So, in my amateur observations, it appears to me that the significance of the ‘York University’ is two-fold:

  1. The judge first considered the strength and potential validity of the statements which were ‘potentially defamatory’ or ‘fraudulent’.   Only after a strong ‘prima facie’ (or ‘bona fide’ – there was some significant discussion there – it appears that ‘bona fide’ was acknowledged but the strength of it was sufficient for ‘prima facie, which is the test which both the CCLA and CIPPC suggested should be done – I think….but I could be wrong, as the discussion was fast-paced and I could not write that fast…but the fact remains that a strong case WAS established)  case was established – only after this strong case that the ‘speech’ was ‘defamatory’ had been established did the judge rule that the private information ought to be handed over.
  2. The anonymous people in the ‘York University’ had a user-agreement which permitted the disclosure of their information to authorities upon request.  This constitutes ‘consent’ to have their names released:  which is not the case in the FreeDominion user agreement, so there is a difference between the two cases right there, meaning a higher standard of proof is needed to compel the Fourniers to release the confidential information about their users.

The ‘Norwich precedent’

This is supporting material for my narrative of the ‘Richard Warman v FreeDominion/internet privacy’ appeal hearing on 8th of April, 2010.

The arguments made during the hearing referenced various cases, rulings and precedents. Since I am not a lawyer, nor trained in law in any way, it helped me understand what was going on when I looked up a few of them.

The Norwich Case

Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974]AC 133, 175, HL

From the ‘Cambridge Law Journal’:

No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.

This case deals with disclosure of private information:  when and how.

In Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, the owner of a patent knew that infringing goods were entering the UK, but could not ascertain their identity. The Commissioners, in the course of performing their duties, had information that would identify the imports. Also, they had unknowingly played a part in facilitating importation of infringing goods. The House of Lords found that where a third party had become involved in unlawful conduct, they were under a duty to assist the person suffering damage by giving them full information and disclosing the identity of wrongdoers.

In other words, the ‘disclosure’ of private information by a witness is not ‘automatic’ but some threshold of proof has to be met to satisfy a judge that the request is reasonable and for the information to be released.

However, if the person who holds the information sought is ‘an accomplice’ (in some way – knowingly or not), if that person is facilitating the ‘wrongdoing’, then they are compelled to release all relevant information right away.

This became important during the ‘Warman v FD/internet privacy’ case, because Free Dominion and its administrators, Connie and Mark Fournier, were named as co-defendants in the action by Mr. Warman.

The question, in my never-humble, not-legally-trained, opinion is whether the Fourniers are simply witnesses, or if they are also culpable in the defamation.

If they are simply witnesses who hold private information, then they cannot be compelled to release it until a judge is satisfied there is a ‘prima facie’ – or at least ‘bona fide’ case to do so.  (Yes, there was much back-and-forth as to which threshold, ‘bona fide’ or ‘prima facie’ ought to be used.)

If they are also partially guilty, then it is their duty to turn all information they might have over, right away.

That is the relevance of the Norwich precedent to this case.

‘Automatic disclosure’ vs ‘Bona Fide’ vs ‘Prima Facie’: the differences

The ongoing narrative of this appeal hearing is here.

Much of the discussion revolved over just how much justification does one need in order to demand information which could lead to the identification of people who posted anonymous comments on the internet, so Richard Warman couls sue them for defamation.  Can he just demand the information – and just get it released (‘automatic disclosure’), or do the people who hold the information (Free Dominion – Connie and Mark Fournier) have the right to withhold it until a judge decides that Mr. Warman has met either the ‘bona fide’ or ‘prima facie’ standard?

For those of us not trained in law, here is a quick overview of the legal terms ‘automatic disclosure’, ‘Bona Fide’ and ‘Prima Facie’ (as understood by me).

‘Bona Fide’

Latin for ‘in good faith’.

In the context of this case, the term was applied in the sense of ‘establishing a bona fide case’ that information was being sought ‘in good faith’, not frivolously.  For example, coming to someone and demanding the identity of their client carries no obligation to reveal such identity.  If, however, one can demonstrate that one truly intends to sue that client, this might (depending on circumstances) constitute a ‘bona fide’ (non-frivolous) reason for requesting the disclosure.

In effect, it distinguishes between someone requesting the information ‘just because they can’ and someone who truly and honestly needs it for some legal purpose.  Therefore, having to establish a ‘bona fide’ reason for requesting some information is a higher threshold than ‘automatic disclosure upon request’.

‘Prima Facie’

Latin for ‘on the face of it’ or ‘at first look’.

It is similar to ‘bona fide’, in that one must demonstrate a need for some information they would like released to them.  However, the threshold in ‘prima facie’ is higher:  one must not only demonstrate that one wishes to use the information (like, say, by filing a defamation suit), one must also demonstrate that there at least some evidence that, at first look, suggests one may have been defamed.

It does not require one to prove that one was defamed, only that at ‘first look’, he could have been.  A look at the statements themselves is sufficient to establish whether they could, potentially, be defamatory.  If not, then the ‘prima facie’ has not been met and there is no release of information.  If, on the other hand, the statements are such that they could, potentially, be defamatory, then the ‘prima facie’ threshold is met, the information is released and the lawsuit may proceed:  it will now be up to the lawsuit to determine if the statements were true or not (truth of the statements is a defense).

The differences between the thresholds of ‘need’ for the identity of the anonymous posters to the Free Dominion forum became an important theme in the hearing.  So, let me recap what my (untrained) understanding of the differences between them are:

Automatic disclosure:  anyone asks for the identity, claiming whatever reason, the information must be handed to them.

Bona fide case: only after one demonstrates that one has an ‘honest intent’ need for the information, like, say, legal action for defamation, the information must be handed to over.  This protects the anonymous people form having their identity revealed and potentially have their reputation damaged simply due to ‘frivolous requests’ – or from opening them to political persecution.

Prima facie case: only after one demonstrates that the statements which were made about one are indeed potentially defamatory, and that one does indeed intend to take action, must the information be handed over to them.  This protects the people form not only ‘frivolous requests’ for their identity to be revealed, but also from ‘frivolous lawsuits’ which have no chance of being successful, yet which in themselves are being used to ‘punish’ (lawfare and SLAPP suits would fall into this category).

I cannot stress strongly enough that I am not trained in law in any way, shape or manner.  These are simply the things I had to learn in order to understand the principles discussed during the ‘Richard Warman v. FreeDominion/internet privacy’ appeal hearing.  This is meant as a lay explanation – it helped me, I hope it will help you as well…..

More of my observations of this hearing – and tools to understand the case – are here.

What the ‘Warman vs. FD/internet privacy’ case is all about

When the ruling in this case was released in March of 2009, there was much commentary by smart and learned people of what this case is all about and what its implications are on our society.

Michael Geist is a law professor at University of Ottawa, where he holds the Canada Research Chair in e-Commerce and Internet law.  He is also the founder of Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), an intervenor in the appeal hearing.  This is what he had to say:

Protection for anonymous postings is certainly not an absolute, but a high threshold that requires prima facie evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim is critical to ensuring that a proper balance is struck between the rights of a plaintiff (whether in a defamation or copyright case) and the privacy and free speech rights of the poster.

Read the full post here.

Don Butler has a piece on the appeal:

Their decision could chill whistleblowers and others who use pseudonyms to post controversial comments, say civil libertarians.And, they maintain, if the judges support unmasking anonymous posters, that could erode their privacy by allowing others to piece together vast amounts of personal information.

Read the rest here.

So, yes – the implications of this ruling are ‘big’.

Please, keep in mind that I have no legal training whatsoever – so I am only commenting on what I saw and heard, as I saw and heard it.  But, having watched the appeal hearing, this is what I understood to be the issues this case revolves about:

  • Mr. Warman saw a number of posts on FreeDominion, a conservative discussion forum, which posted either comments that Mr. Warman considered defamatory, or which linked to a completely different website, where some other people made statements Mr. Warman considered defamatory
  • Mr. Warman decided to sue the anonymous posters – and Mark and Connie Fournier, the administrators of FreeDominion
  • The Honourable Mr. Justice Stanley Kershman decided in favour of Mr. Warman and ordered the Fourniers to release the information sought
  • The Fourniers have appealed – hence, this hearing.

It is important to understand Justice Kershman’s ruling, so we can understand the grounds of the appeal.  From the ruling (the links are mine):

[13] The Plaintiff relies on the case of Lillie v. Bisson, [1999) OJ. No. 3677 (CA.), a case
in which the Ontario Court of Appeal says that courts should encourage a liberal interpretation of
Rule 76 in order to reduce the cost of litigating modest sums.

[15] Tue Defendant relies on Irwin Toy for the proposition that disclosure should not be
automatic upon the issuance of a Statement of Claim:

If such were to be the case, the fact of the anonymity of the internet could be
shattered for the price of the issuance of spurious Statement of Claim and the
benefits obtained by the anonymity lost in inappropriate circumstances.

(16) The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by way of
affidavit evidence before disclosure is ordered.

[33] In the case before the court, we are dealing with an anti-hate speech advocate and
Defendants whose website is so controversial that it is blocked to employees of the Ontario
Public Service.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Stanley Kershman ruled that the Fourniers (of the ‘controversial website’) must ‘automatically’ hand over all information which could lead to the identification of the ‘John Does’ to the ( ‘anti-hate-speech advocate’):  hence, the appeal!

The ‘Warman vs. FD/internet privacy’ appeal hearing: the facts

Thursday, 8th of April, 2010,  the Superior Court of Ontario held an appeal hearing of the ‘Richard Warman vs. Connie Fournier, Mark Fournier and John Does’, often also referred to as the ‘Richard Warman vs. Free Dominion’ case and the ‘Richard Warman vs. internet privacy’ case.

But, let me start at the beginning.  Let me stress that I have absolutely no legal training, so these are my personal observations and should in no way be considered to be anything other than those of a regular person trying to make sense of this case and its implications on our daily lives.

First, the facts:

The case was appealed.  The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic requested and were granted intervenor status.

So much for the ‘dry facts’!

More of what I have said about this hearing is listed on this page.

‘Warman vs. internet privacy’ case appeal hearing, part 3: introductions

They narrative of my observations of this event started out in a rather tongue-in-cheek manner:  fully aware of the importance of this case, this was my way of relieving some of the tension.  However, now that I will be describing the proceedings themselves, my reporting will be as accurate as possible. Connie Fournier’s observations of these same proceedings can be found here and here.

When I last left off, the 3 judges had entered the courtroom, dispensed with another matter and invited all the lawyers present – for both sides in the action as well as the two intervening parties.

Describing positions as seen from the spectator benches in the courtroom, the introductions began on the right:

On behalf of the intervenor Canadian Civil Liberties (CCLA), there  were

Representing the appellants, Connie and Mark Fournier, there was

On behalf of the intervenor Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), there was

On behalf of the complainant, Richard Warman, there were

Very interesting group of people!

The judges did not introduce themselves.  However, these are their names (again, the order is from right to left, as observed if one had their back against the ‘main’ door):

  • The Honourable Mr. Justice Herman J. Wilton-Siegel
  • The Honourable Mr. Justice James C. Kent
  • The Honourable Mr. Justice Thomas A. Heeney

I do not know the name of the Clerk of the Court or the Bailiff.

As I said in my earlier post, the spectators included David Fewer, as well as Connie Fournier, Mark Fournier, Guy Poirier, a young woman whom I presume to have been an aid to the Katz/Lewis team, an unidentified blond woman in a gray pantsuit and myself.

Surprisingly enough, these were all the people there!

    My observations from the ‘Warman vs. internet privacy’ appeal – part 2

    When my narrative last left off, I had finally arrived!

    (Connie Fournier’s excellent report is here and here.)

    It seemed like a miracle, but, despite my bumbling and probably due to more luck than skill, I had found Courtroom #36 where the hearing of the appeal of the Richard Warman vs. the Free Dominion folks, Connie and Mark Fournier and their users, was being held. There were none of the throngs of reporters I had expected – perhaps their quest in finding this well-concealed hearing was less successful than mine.

    After exchanging greetings with Mark and Connie, as well as Guy Piorier (a blog reader who also came to lend his support to the Fourniers), it was time to get oriented a little.

    I was there in time – he courtroom was still locked! The hearing had been scheduled for 10:00 o’clock. So far, so good.

    So, how much time was there before things got going? A quick glance at the clock just to the left of the courtroom door said it was…. 10:34.

    10:34?!?!?

    Ah – it was showing ‘real time’! Not the ‘we-stole-an-hour-from-you-and-you-can’t-do-anything-about-it’ time! OK – let’s get that adrenalin back under control….

    10:45 – as the clock read: a huddle of black robes just outside the courtroom door. Yup – the door is still locked.

    The air is positively crackling with anxious anticipation!

    10:50 – as the clock read: doors opened and the lawyers – plus whom I presume to have been a support person to one of their ‘groups’ – and all the waiting spectators enter Courtroom #36.

    Stepping into the courtroom was like taking a step backwards in time. By about an hour. The clock inside was set to the Daylight Savings Time.

    OK – I am new at this ‘on the grounds, reporting’ thing, but, I seem to recollect that I am to give as many facts as I will have managed to collect. Here, then, is the full and complete list of spectators who entered the courtroom: Mark Fournier, Connie Fournier, Guy Poirier, David Fewer and, well, yours truly. Yes. That is it. In total.

    Instead of fighting for a seat with throngs of other spectators, as was my fear, I now had a different dilemma with respect to finding a seat. Do I sit on the bride’s side, or the groom’s side?

    Is referring to the sides as ‘bride’s’ and ‘groom’s’ disrespectful to the court?

    That box in the middle – that is ‘the prisoners’ box’ and, apparently, it is disrespectful to refer to it as ‘the penalty box’. I know, because I asked.

    Things did work themselves out. There were 3 sections of seats: one on each side and one in the middle, right behind the prisoners’ box. Mr. Fewer took a seat on the left (all the ‘side’ references I’ll make are as if you were to stand with the ‘main’ door immediately behind your back), towards the front. The young woman whom I presume to have been a support person to the ‘Warman’ lawyers sat a few rows behind him.

    I followed Connie and Mark towards the front right, where we shared a row, while Mr. Poirier sat right behind us.

    The lawyers resolved themselves into seats at a long table immediately in front of the prisoners’ box, with their backs to us, spectators. Their 6 chairs were facing forward, divided in the middle by a lectern they would speak from when making their submissions to the court (I think that is the proper term – if not, please excuse me….the sum of my ‘legal experience’  is watching ‘Jurisprudence’ on TV, so these are all strictly the observations of a legal amateur).

    Immediately in front of the lawyers’ table, and slightly raised, was the Clerk’s table – he sat facing us. At the left side of the Clerk’s table sat another person.

    10:02:10 – a deep hush descended on the courtroom. The atmosphere was so thick, you could not just ‘cut it with a knife’ – you could chip at it with an ice-pick! The only thing we could hear was the distant heartbeat of high-heeled pumps, drumming purposefully through the corridors of justice…

    10:05:15 – another spectator wafted in. A young blond woman in a gray pantsuit, high-heeled pumps and a perplexing demeanour. She sat in the very middle of the ‘spectator area’, which took up roughly 2/3 of the area of the room.

    I called her demeanour perplexing, and, to me, it was. It was not so much what she did – but how she did it. She sat there. Very, very deliberately, she avoided all eye-contact, looking either directly ahead or at her very nice shoes. If my shoes were that nice, I’d probably spend considerable time looking at them, too – but she did not look like she had the industrial dose of OCD that I do, so that is probably not saying much.

    Perhaps she had a tooth-ache. She would come in at the last moment, then rush off, at the start of each break, so nobody could say hi to her (I would have liked to have). But, I am getting ahead of myself!

    10:05:45 – announced and ushered in by the bailiff (who looked nothing like Bull Shannon), the 3 judges who would be hearing this appeal entered the courtroom.

    They did look very official (in a good way). They wore black lawyers’ robes, but with a crisp, bright red sashes t top the off.

    Upon taking their seats, the judge in the centre went over some correspondence from an appellant from a case that was put before the Fournier one, but where the appellant had mistakenly showed up the day before the proper date (perhaps the appellant got help form the information kiosk), so they agreed to hold that hearing over till the 10th of October, 2010.

    At this point, the person sitting at the side of the Clerk’s table was excused.

    Next, the judges invited everyone to introduce themselves….but, that shall be then next instalment in my report. And, as the real, serious stuff is about to start, I’ll try to minimize injecting humour to relieve the tension of this truly important legal event.

    More corporate fascism for squashing freedom of speech

    In my short post yesterday, Thunderf00t’s video demonstrated how easy it is for a large corporation – specifically Google, which controls how the vast majority of information on the internet is accessed – could easily collude with politicians for their own benefit…and to the detriment of us, the ‘little people’.  In addition, Thunderf00t demonstrated how, through YouTube, Google had already demonstrated that they do censor (by not allowing their search engines to ‘pick it up’ and thus making it ‘virtually dissappear’) information which is critical of them…

    The desire, means and ability:  it’s all there!

    Sadly, that is just the tip of the iceberg!!!

    From Michael Geist:

    … the Electronic Commerce Protection Act comes to a conclusion in committee on Monday as MPs conduct their “clause by clause” review. While I have previously written about the lobbying pressure to water down the legislation [to protect consumer rights] (aided and abetted by the Liberal and Bloc MPs on the committee) and the CMA’s recent effort to create a huge loophole, I have not focused on a key source of the pressure. Incredibly, it has been the copyright lobby – particularly the software and music industries – that has been engaged in a full court press to make significant changes to the bill.

    The DRM [Digital Rights Managament] concern arises from a requirement in the bill to obtain consent before installing software programs on users’ computers. This anti-spyware provision applies broadly, setting an appropriate standard of protection for computer users. Yet the copyright lobby fears it could inhibit installation of DRM-type software without full knowledge and consent. Sources say that the Liberals have introduced a motion that would take these practices outside of the bill.

    Even more troubling are proposed changes that would allow copyright owners to secretly access [personal] information on users’ computers.

    (my emphasis and notes)

    OK – let’s sum up:

    Large multinational corporations are lobbying (and succeeding, with Liberal and Quebec PMs) to allow changes to the proposed  Electronic Commerce Protection Act which will permit – in the name of protecting their copyright – manufacturers of products (from video games to music CDs to just about anything else that is ‘electronic media’) to install and run programs on your computer, which would gather personal data about you and your computer use.  And, it would allow them to do it without your permission – and even without your knowledge!!!

    If there really are people out there who think this is something that only concerns people who steal music or movies, please, think twice.

    Do we permit the police – who, at least, are accountable to the citizenry – to wiretap our phone ‘just to make sure we are not breaking the law’?  NO!  They must prove, to the satisfaction of a judge, that there is a cause for surveillance, get a court order, and only then can they listen in.  If it ever gets to court, the police are obligated to disclose all that they have.  And, so it should be.

    This lobbied-for change would, in effect, permit private corporations – who are not accountable to anyone but their own BOD and shareholders – to ‘wiretap’ your computer, monitor every keystroke, access data in every bit of memory.  Without any judicial oversight, without any requirement that they disclose the information they collected – or what it was they were collecting in the first place.

    This would permit corporations to install ANY SPYWARE  THEY WANT on ANY computer… and this software could attack any program or data it deemed to be in breech of DRM.

    And, you have no say in it.

    Remember what happened to all those Kindle users, who woke up one day and found books they legally purchased deleted, because somewhere higher up the chain, people were bickering about digital rights?

    Well, this would become the norm:  anyone who had any claim to a copyright could install software on your computer – without you even knowing about it – and if this found anything it considered breeched its DRM, it would delete it.  Even if you bought it legally.  Because if there were any dispute anywhere along the line, their ability to delete ‘the content’ would be supreme.  Really.

    Is this reasonable?

    Is this the fair balance of rights?

    And if you don’t think this is happening already, you are wrong!

    Even Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, Jennifer Stoddart, warns of the impact these changes would have to the privacy rights of Canadian citizens:

    Technological advances hold out the promise of greater convenience, but sometimes at a cost to human rights such as privacy and the ability to control our personal information.

    Meanwhile, governments and businesses have a seemingly insatiable appetite for personal information.

    Governments appear to believe – mistakenly, I would argue – that the key to national security and public safety is collecting mountains of personal data. Privacy often receives short shrift as new anti-terrorism and law enforcement initiatives are rolled out.

    Personal information has also become a hot commodity in the private sector. Our names, addresses, purchases, interests, likes and dislikes are recorded, analysed and stored – all so companies can sell us more products and services.

    Adding to our concerns is the fact many businesses fail to adequately protect this sensitive information – leaving it vulnerable to hackers and identity thieves.

    And if you thought THAT was not enough….

    This idea has been ‘rumbling about’ for a few months, but recently received publicity when Eugene Kasparsky openly stated that each internet user should have an internet passport.  This would, presumably, document their every click and keystroke, which could then be monitored through increased internet regulation.  I dare reach this conclusion because Mr. Kasparsky also said that there must be no anonymity on the internet, and any country which refuses to regulate and monitor its citizens should be cut off the net.

    Oh, and this should all be enforced by ‘internet police’!

    I’d like to change the design of the Internet by introducing regulation—Internet passports, Internet police, and international agreement—about following Internet standards. – Eugene Kaspersky,
    CEO of Russia’s Kaspersky Lab

    OK – this idea is radical now.  You may shake your head and say this will never be possible.

    But, 40 years ago, did anyone think that, once accused, the ‘truth’ could not be used as ‘defense’?